an excerpt from the hyde act

One Hundred Ninth Congress
of the
United States of America
AT THE SECOND SESSION
Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
the third day of January, two thousand and six
An Act
To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed
nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
TITLE I—UNITED STATES AND INDIA
NUCLEAR COOPERATION
SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ‘‘Henry J. Hyde United States-
India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006’’.
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that—
(1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other
weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and
the means to deliver them are critical objectives for United
States foreign policy;
(2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
and strengthening its implementation, particularly its
verification and compliance, is the keystone of United States
nonproliferation policy;
(3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing
the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining
a stable international security situation;
(4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT
and remain outside that treaty’s legal regime pose a potential
challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global
nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken
the NPT obligation to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons
capabilities;
(5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest
extent possible to ensure that those countries that are not
States Party to the NPT are responsible in the disposition
of any nuclear technology they develop;
(6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into
an agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to
section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)
with a country that has never been a State Party to the NPT
if—
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(A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior
with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related
to nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;
(B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted
democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that
is congruent to that of the United States, and is working
with the United States on key foreign policy initiatives
related to nonproliferation;
(C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate
and implement substantially improved protections against
the proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons
and the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions
that would further the development of its nuclear weapons
program; and
(D) such cooperation will induce the country to give
greater political and material support to the achievement
of United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives,
especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and,
if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor
terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire
a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass
destruction capability and the means to deliver such
weapons;
(7) the United States should continue its policy of engagement,
collaboration, and exchanges with and between India
and Pakistan;
(8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the national
interest of the United States;
(9) the United States and India share common democratic
values and the potential for increasing and sustained economic
engagement;
(10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the
United States and other countries has the potential to benefit
the people of all countries;
(11) such commerce also represents a significant change
in United States policy regarding commerce with countries
that are not States Party to the NPT, which remains the
foundation of the international nonproliferation regime;
(12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by
the United States and other countries must be achieved in
a manner that minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or
regional arms races and maximizes India’s adherence to international
nonproliferation regimes, including, in particular, the
guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG); and
(13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or
encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any
other party if such exports are terminated under United States
law.
SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.
(a) IN GENERAL.—The following shall be the policies of the
United States:
(1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce
nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or
outside of the NPT.
(2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the
right to ‘‘develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
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for peaceful purposes’’, as set forth in Article IV of the NPT,
as being a right that applies only to the extent that it is
consistent with the object and purpose of the NPT to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities,
including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with
any State Party that the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) determines is not in full compliance with its NPT obligations,
including its safeguards obligations.
(3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines
for Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of
Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and
Related Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions
related to the those guidelines, and the rules and practices
regarding NSG decisionmaking.
(4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning
consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and
recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely
and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations,
including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved
recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing
cooperation with such recipient until such time as a
consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.
(5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies
related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing
of spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work
with members of the NSG, individually and collectively, to
further restrict the transfers of such equipment and technologies,
including to India.
(6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear
equipment, materials, or technology from other participating
governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear
transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant
to this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011
et seq.), or any other United States law.
(b) WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH ASIA.—The following shall be
the policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:
(1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium
on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes
by India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China.
(2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion
and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States
and India become parties.
(3) Secure India’s—
(A) full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative;
(B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction
Principles of such Initiative;
(C) public announcement of its decision to conform
its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the
Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria,
and Control Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement;
(D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward
implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C);
and
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(E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done
at Vienna on September 12, 1997.
(4) Secure India’s full and active participation in United
States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction
and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the
capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and
the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
(5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals
in South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual
elimination.
(6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India’s civilian
nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States
except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures
required under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 (f)).
(7) Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium
described in paragraph (1) or the treaty described in paragraph
(2), encourage India not to increase its production of fissile
material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
(8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional
Protocol to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably
safeguard any export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials
and equipment.
(9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any agreement
for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section
123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet
the requirements set forth in subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through
a.(9) of such section.
(10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to
the Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear
facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating
requirements.
SEC. 104. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.
(a) IN GENERAL.—If the President makes the determination
described in subsection (b), the President may—
(1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India
arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the requirement of subsection
a.(2) of such section;
(2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to exports
to India; and
(3) waive with respect to India the application of—
(A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and
(B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158) regarding
any actions that occurred before July 18, 2005.
(b) DETERMINATION BY THE PRESIDENT.—The determination
referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the President
that the following actions have occurred:
(1) India has provided the United States and the IAEA
with a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear
facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration
regarding its civil facilities and materials with the IAEA.
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(2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps
required prior to signature by the parties of an agreement
requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in
accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices
(including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621
(1973)) to India’s civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs
as declared in the plan described in paragraph (1),
including materials used in or produced through the use of
India’s civil nuclear facilities.
(3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress
toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA
principles, practices, and policies that would apply to India’s
civil nuclear program.
(4) India is working actively with the United States for
the early conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the cessation
of the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices.
(5) India is working with and supporting United States
and international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment
and reprocessing technology to any state that does not already
possess full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing
plants.
(6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear
and other sensitive materials and technology, including
through—
(A) the enactment and effective enforcement of comprehensive
export control legislation and regulations;
(B) harmonization of its export control laws, regulations,
policies, and practices with the guidelines and practices
of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
and the NSG; and
(C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance
with the procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence.
(7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply
to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the
NSG.
(c) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.—
(1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall submit to the appropriate
congressional committees the determination made pursuant
to subsection (b), together with a report detailing the basis
for the determination.
(2) INFORMATION TO BE INCLUDED.—To the fullest extent
available to the United States, the report referred to in paragraph
(1) shall include the following information:
(A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the
United States and the IAEA to separate India’s civil and
military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and
the declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying
India’s civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards,
including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and
declaration, together with copies of the plan and declaration.
(B) A summary of the agreement that has been entered
into between India and the IAEA requiring the application
of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India’s
civil nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described
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in subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the agreement,
and a description of the progress toward its full
implementation.
(C) A summary of the progress made toward conclusion
and implementation of an Additional Protocol between
India and the IAEA, including a description of the scope
of such Additional Protocol.
(D) A description of the steps that India is taking
to work with the United States for the conclusion of a
multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons, including a description of the
steps that the United States has taken and will take to
encourage India to identify and declare a date by which
India would be willing to stop production of fissile material
for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral
moratorium or treaty.
(E) A description of the steps India is taking to prevent
the spread of nuclear-related technology, including enrichment
and reprocessing technology or materials that can
be used to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, as well
as the support that India is providing to the United States
to further United States objectives to restrict the spread
of such technology.
(F) A description of the steps that India is taking
to secure materials and technology applicable for the
development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of
mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons
through the application of comprehensive export control
legislation and regulations, and through harmonization
with and adherence to MTCR, NSG, Australia Group, and
Wassenaar Arrangement guidelines, compliance with
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and
participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
(G) A description and assessment of the specific measures
that India has taken to fully and actively participate
in United States and international efforts to dissuade, isolate,
and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including
a nuclear weapons capability and the capability to enrich
uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver
weapons of mass destruction.
(H) A description of the decision of the NSG relating
to nuclear cooperation with India, including whether
nuclear cooperation by the United States under an agreement
for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is
consistent with the decision, practices, and policies of the
NSG.
(I) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation
envisioned by the United States and India that will be
implemented under the agreement for nuclear cooperation,
including whether such cooperation will include the provision
of enrichment and reprocessing technology.
(J) A description of the steps taken to ensure that
proposed United States civil nuclear cooperation with India
will not in any way assist India’s nuclear weapons program.
(d)